Abstract-To offload and alleviate the heavy base station (BS) traffic load caused by the rapidly growing video services, deviceto-device (D2D) communication, as one of the most indispensable technologies of the future cellular networks, can be potentially exploited by mobile users to distribute videos for a BS. In this paper, an effective pricing-based multicast video distribution system and a grid-based clustering method are proposed to support the distribution. Moreover, with the consideration of users' mobility and social characteristics, we classify them into multicast and core types by studying the user stay probability and familiarity. In particular, core users can cooperate with the BS to distribute videos to the multicast users through intracluster D2D multicast. However, core users cannot selflessly help the BS to distribute videos; instead, they will evaluate their personal benefits before distributing the videos to the multicast users. Further, a Stackelberg game-based pricing mechanism is proposed to inspire the core users to distribute videos. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can not only effectively alleviate the BS traffic load, but also significantly improve the effectiveness and reliability of video transmission.
Social Attribute Aware Incentive Mechanism for Device-to-Device Video Distribution out the traffic of mobile data services in cellular networks by 2020 will be about 9 times the traffic in 2014 [1] , among which mobile video will increase 25-fold between 2011 and 2016, accounting for over 70% of total mobile data traffic by 2016 [2] . Thus, the ever-growing number of users and user demands for mobile video services consequently cause severe BS load. Due to the limited radio spectrum resources of cellular communication systems, the system capacity and radio spectrum utilization should be improved to provide better user experience [3] [4] [5] . Traditionally, cellular users request video services from a BS individually and the BS allocates resources for each user to support the corresponding video streaming. In the network scenarios with massive users such as football games and superstar concerts, the large volume of multimedia video streaming and insufficient radio spectrum resource may compromise Quality of Service (QoS). Especially for users with relatively far distances to the BS and with the explosive demand for high quality video streaming from mobile devices (e.g.,tablets, smartphones), their QoS satisfaction can be severely affected and the delay sensitive multimedia services cannot be reliably delivered [6] . In addition, previous research works indicate the ClickThrough Rate (CTR) and popularity of a given video are closely correlated and follow the Zipf distribution [7] . 1 For instance, 20% of the popular videos in top video streaming sites have 80% of the CTR. Obviously, local users are likely to request same video services and the resulting repeated multimedia data transmission consumes massive network resources in the traditional cellular network, which notably affects the delay performance and efficiency of the transmission process [8] [9] [10] . Therefore, It is critical to improve the efficiency of same Video-on-Demand transmission [11] , [12] .
To address aforementioned problems, some solutions such as the novel resource allocation algorithms and forwarding collaboration methods based on micro cells [13] [14] [15] [16] have been proposed. However, the resource allocation algorithms cannot reduce the redundancy of multimedia transmission and the volume of video services grow much faster than the system capacity. Besides, forwarding collaboration methods based on micro cells involve complex network structures, which inevitably results in increased video transmission latency and management complexity. To fully exploit the network resources, the relatively flexible D2D communication was proposed by 3GPP. The basic idea of this technique is to take the opportunity of two mobile users who are physically close to each other and establish a 1 [Online] . Available: http://traces.cs.umass.edu/index.php/network/network 1520-9210 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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direct link between them [17] , which can dramatically reduce the traffic loads of the BS and transmission distance, while providing enhanced radio spectrum utilization, network throughput and QoS [18] , [19] . Furthermore, the mobile users carrying the popular video data can share it with neighbor users in D2D multicast manner. Obviously, the appropriate design of multicast structure (e.g., cluster, tree [20] ) is crucial to the transmission of video services. Apparently, it still remains significant research challenges to transmit video streaming in mobile environment [21] such as mobile cellular networks. The random mobility of cellular users and unpredictable device trajectories make the multicast structure dynamical, the connections between users unstable and the data transmission process frequently interrupted [22] . Numerous theoretical researches and practical measurements pointed out that the encounter interval between users follows the Pareto distribution, namely the "big world, small world" feature of cellular networks [23] . In the "small world", socially close users encounter with each other frequently and the encounter duration is relatively long, which can be exploited to construct a stable multicast structure, avoid the resource overhead of frequent reestablishment and guarantee the reliable and efficient video service transmission. Besides, the network performance can be affected by the users' selfish behaviors which are mainly due to the objective reasons such as the device malfunctions and insufficient buffer and energy, and the subjective reasons such as the privacy, social relationship [24] , social interest of Internet video sharing [25] , [26] , trust issues and active degrees. Therefore, an incentive mechanism should be designed to simulate selfish users to reduce their selfish behaviors, by which the benefits of the BS and users can be both maximized.
To solve the above problems, a master-slave video distribution structure is proposed in this paper, which consists of a BS (i.e., leader) as the video services provider, and some core users (i.e., core users) as video distributors and some requesting users as video buyers. This "supply-chain" of video services should comprehensively consider users' mobility and social characteristics so that the connection stability of the requesting users and the core users are derived by measuring the user stay probability and familiarity between users. As mentioned above, the core users, after receiving the multicast videos from the BS, will distribute videos to the multicast users through intra-cluster D2D multicast. In particular, intra-cluster D2D multicast communication is applied to allow one representative user to provide a multicast services to multiple users who have the same video requirements. Besides, to achieve the active participation of the core users in the video distribution, the Stackelberg game model is employed in this paper to maximize the benefits between the BS and the core users and motivate the core users to distribute videos for the BS. The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
1) A pricing-based multicast video distribution system and a grid-based clustering method are proposed to manage the video users. It can effectively reduce the BS load and guarantee the real time video distribution by D2D multicast and the stable link establishment between users. 2) A detection method based on the geographic locations of users is proposed in this paper, which can be further utilized to select stable multicast users as core user candidates according to the user stay probability. 3) A familiarity-aware core user selection method is proposed in this paper, which evaluates the user familiarity according to the encounter frequency between users. The selected core users have strong collaborative motivation to promote video distribution. 4) An incentive mechanism of forming a master-slave structure is proposed in this paper to reduce selfish behaviors of core users and maximize the benefits between the BS and the core users. The Stackelberg game model is employed to dynamically price the video services, effectively motivate core users and enhance the system resource utilization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related literature are reviewed in Section II. A pricing-based multicast video distribution system and a grid-based clustering method are presented in Section III. Section IV introduces multicast users and the core user selection methods by taking into account the mobility and social attributes of users. The Stackelberg-based user incentive mechanism is introduced in Section V. Simulation results are analyzed in Section VI. Lastly, the conclusions are reached in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Designing incentive mechanisms for D2D multicast communications are faced with various challenges. Generally, research works have an assumption that D2D users selflessly collaborate with each other or BS. The assumption, however, is impractical for real D2D application scenarios. The relative works about incentive mechanisms for D2D communications are introduced below.
The work in [27] proposed a collaborative D2D communication method. It adaptively selected the D2D users to forward data by multiplexing, opportunistic and dedicated manners according to parameters such as the channel quality, which effectively guaranteed the data transmission efficiency. The works in [28] [29] [30] pointed out that the cellular data distribution can be achieved through D2D opportunistic deliveries, which could reduce the BS load and enhance the data transmission efficiency. However, these works all shared the assumption that D2D users selflessly collaborated with each other and ignored the fact that selfish user behaviors existed due to different personal benefits. The authors in [31] proposed a currency-based D2D opportunistic delivery mechanism to prompt the opportunistic user collaboration for the BS load reduction. The proposed mechanisms based on the dynamical user features can effectively enhance the user experience and reduce the data transmission delay. The authors in [32] comprehensively analyzed the benefits of data receiver and forwarder during the opportunistic D2D data delivery process, constructed a reasonable network scenario, proposed a network structure based game model to capture the selfish behavior of users and eventually designed a history information based data sharing strategy. In addition, video coding approaches [46] [47] [48] could help the transmission efficiency by reducing the data size. However, in many network scenarios where certain videos are repeatedly and frequently requested, the multicast transmission can be employed to enhance the video delivery efficiency by selectively forwarding video and avoiding unnecessary transmissions. The multicast-based video transmission can achieve a higher video transmission efficiency than unicast-based and broadcast-based methods, which also effectively offloads the cellular traffic. The work in [33] proposed a random buffering mechanism to randomly distribute repeatedly requested content to users. When a user device receives a content request, it directly checks the buffers of itself or its neighbors. Some research works in [34] [35] [36] proposed clustering-based multicast core user selection methods and corresponding data transmission mechanism to optimize the efficiency of multicast D2D communication. The work in [37] proposed a social attribute aware multicast D2D video communication system by considering video transmission patterns. Besides, the trust between core users and its neighbors was also considered to evaluate the collaboration efficiency and to consequently reduce the energy consumption.
To summarize, the literature rarely considered multicast user selection strategies for mobile network scenarios with the mobility and social attributes of users and the incentive mechanism to reduce selfish behaviors by D2D multicast manner. Besides, the hierarchical relationship between the BS and the core users, namely the master-slave relationship is also not sufficiently analyzed and exploited in D2D multicast scenarios.
III. NETWORK MODEL D2D users directly communicate with each other with a relatively low transmitting power, which makes it possible to effectively reuse the spectrum resources of cellular network. A typical video distribution scenario for D2D multicast communication is shown in Fig. 1 , where n users U = {u 1 
BS. Specifically, we divide the cellular users into common users, requesting users, multicast users and core users, where common users have no video requests, multicast users are selected from requesting users according to the strategy proposed in Section IV, and core users who cooperate with BS to distribute the videos to the multicast users through intra-cluster D2D multicast are selected from multicast users as the representatives.
Obviously, as the provider of videos, BS is responsible for the video distribution according to the received video requests. As the distributors of videos, core users receive the multicast videos from the BS and distribute them to their neighbor multicast users. The video distribution process is launched by the BS and assisted by core users. However, the video forwarding process of core users consumes energy and buffer resources and the resource consumption increases with the growing number of multicast requesting users. Considering the contribution of core users in the video distribution process, the BS provides a lower distributor price of the videos for core users. However, core users may present selfish behaviors due to the conflict of benefits, which consequently affects the video distribution performance. Therefore, the incentive mechanism should be designed to prompt the core users for better video distribution performance. Firstly, BS determines the initial price and core users can negotiate an optimal distribution price. Furthermore, the optimal distributor price and initial price can be determined jointly to simulate the core users for active participation in the video distribution process.
Based on the aforementioned network model, our research addresses three major problems: 1) the selfish user behaviors, the real time and reliability requirements of video transmission; 2) to enhance the efficiency and reliability of video transmission, the stable users need to be determined and the social attributes need to be fully exploited to select the core users; 3) the incentive mechanism should be designed to prompt the core users for the better video distribution performance and to reduce the overall system resource consumption.
A. Multicast Video Distribution System
To enable effective the videos transmission in the aforementioned scenarios, a pricing-based multicast video distribution system is shown in Fig. 2 , which consists of a BS side and multiple mobile users.
The BS side includes a transceiver, video scheduler, video encoder, user controller, user attribute evaluation module, and pricing module, where orthogonal frequency division multiple access (OFDMA) is exploited in BS transceiver part to support the video multicast for D2D users, and the BS is in charge of spectrum allocation and power control for D2D users in a centralized way. Video scheduler is necessary for BS to protect the QoS of video transmission. For D2D video multicast, each encoded video frame is devided into a number of packets for delivery. Unlike the data transmissions in usually, video multicast is a delay stringent real-time application. Once a packet misses the deadline, it will be dropped. In addition, there is a D2D controller in each D2D user, which is in charge of establishing and managing D2D communications among D2D users. The user attribute evaluation module records social attributes of users such as the encounter times, encounter duration and stay time at various positions. In order to the collaborate with the BS to distribute video for multicast users, the benefits of core users are inevitably affected and should be considered in the pricing model. For each video request a x , the BS prices the video for two different user groups based on whether they cooperate with the BS to distribute the videos or not: on one hand, users receive the videos directly from the BS and core users. Users directly communicate with the BS to obtain video if the number of intra-cluster requesting users is not large enough to support the D2D multicast or the transmission between the users and the core users is unstable. On the other hand, users receiving videos from the BS and cooperate with the BS to distribute the videos through intra-cluster D2D multicast. The user controller can analyze the information provided by the user relationship evaluation module and the pricing module, and then support the operation of the video scheduler. In addition, the users side includes a D2D transceiver, controller, buffer and pricing module, where the D2D buffer is dedicated to forwarding videos for the BS, and the D2D pricing module negotiates with the BS to determine the optimal price and the D2D controller maintains the D2D multicast process.
To sum up, the functions of video request detection, video pricing, user encounter history analysis, link establishment, resource management and allocation are performed by the BS and D2D users to complete the video buffering and distribution.
B. Grid-Based Clustering Method
The multicast video forwarded by core users can effectively assist the BS to distribute videos. However, core users may share the same set of multicast users and the network resource may be wasted by the repeat of video delivery. To eliminate this repeated video forwarding, the network coverage is divided into k × k grid areas, namely clusters C = {c 11 , c 12 , · · · , c kk }. To ensure the real time video transmission for multicast requesting users, stable connections between requesting users and core users must be maintained, meaning that the maximum distance between users in each cluster should not exceed the maximum communication range R of D2D users. Moreover, the number of clusters in the given network can be calculated by
where L is the covering range of the BS and INT (·) is the integer function. Firstly, the BS can receive the video requests and establish the grid-based requesting user structure. For instance, as shown in Fig. 3 , the 5 × 5 grid-based network scenario has 18 video requesting clusters {c 12 , c 13 , c 14 , c 22 · · · , c 55 } and 7 common clusters, where clusters {c 12 , c 13 , c 25 , c 31 , c 42 } do not have enough multicast users for intra-cluster D2D multicast, and the requesting users in {c 22 , c 23 } and some users in {c 14 , c 41 , c 52 , c 55 } do not maintain stable connections with the core users. Therefore, these users directly communicate with the BS to obtain the videos. Furthermore, the core users are selected from the rest of requesting users to distribute videos received from the BS to their neighbor multicast requesting users.
IV. USER CLASSIFICATION
To satisfy the QoS requirement of requesting users, two different video transmission manners should be applied for different users: the direct communication with the BS and the core user assisted communication. Due to the mobility and social attributes of users, some multicast users in a given cluster may have short stay time and can not establish a stable link with core users. As a result, multicast users who fail to receive the videos from core users have to reestablish the communication link with the BS, which wastes network resource and increases transmission delay. To avoid the frequent interrupt of communication links caused by user mobility during the core user assisted communication, multicast users selection should meet the stability requirements in each intra-cluster. In addition, the unfrequent encounter between core users and multicast users may determine the level of willingness to forward data. Therefore, proper core users should be selected to achieve improved intra-cluster video transmission efficiency, transmission delay performance, QoS of users while reducing the base station traffic load.
In a word, the selection of multicast users and core users is crucial to the system resource utilization and QoS of users. Next, this paper presents a method of selecting the multicast users and core users from the video users in each intra-cluster by taking into account the stay probability and familiarity.
A. Multicast Users Selection Method
It is not difficult to find that the longer time users remain in each intra-cluster, the higher probability users stay in the same period, and thus the video delivery rate of users who have high stay probability can be effectively improved. Both the total history stay time S u i in each cluster and the history stay time S c α β u i in cluster c αβ of user u i can be obtained from BS in the same period. By evaluating the proportion of the S c α β u i over S u i , the stay probability of user u i in the same period is given by
For video a x , we assume that the number of users is l c α β in cluster c αβ . Similarly, the average stay probability of requesting users in cluster c αβ can be denoted by (3), and then the average stay probability of requesting users in each clusters can be given by (4)P
In order to ensure that the video is stably transmitted to requesting users, we select certain users who have a high stay probability as same as the multicast users. Thus, the users whose stay time is too short to transmit can be excluded, and then the effectiveness of video transmission can be greatly improved. To effectively select the multicast users, the average stay probability in all clusters given by (4) is used as the selection criteria. When the requesting users in cluster c αβ meet the constraint given by (5), they are considered as the multicast users l c α β in the same cluster.
The method can not only ensure the transmission link stability of Intra-cluster D2D multicast but also reduce the BS load, save network resources, and improve the video transmission rate.
B. Core Users Selection Method
To effectively select the core user in cluster c αβ , we estimate the familiarity among multicast users within cluster c αβ by exploiting the variety of connection status between users. The familiarity between users is a social relationship formed over time. Shorter encounter intervals between users mean more encounter frequencies in a given period, and thus higher familiarity is obtained between users. Therefore, the encounter probability between users is utilized to evaluate the familiarity between users. By analyzing the mobility characteristics of users in the network, it is concluded that the encounter interval between users follows Pareto distribution [38] [39] [40] . Assuming there are l c α β multicast users in cluster c αβ , the user attribute evaluation module proposed in Section III-A can obtain the encounter interval between users. Let T u i ,u j denote the encounter interval between user u i and u j , the cumulative distribution function of
where λ u i ,u j > 0 determines the curve shape of the cumulative distribution function of encounter interval T u i ,u j , and τ
denotes the minimum value of T u i ,u j . Therefore, the encounter probability between user u i and u j at time t can be calculated by
To select the optimal core user in cluster c αβ , the familiarity between user u i and other users is further evaluated according to (7), thus we have
A larger ω c α β u i (t) signifies the closer encounter between user u i and other users in cluster c αβ . By comparing the user familiarity, the user with the highest familiarity with other users is selected as the core user. The proposed core user selection method can effectively improve the connection density among users, enhance the forwarding willingness, reduce the transmission delay, and improve the video QoS and the experience of multicast users.
V. USER INCENTIVE MECHANISM
According to the video multicast system designed in Section III-A, the resource consumption of the core users during the video distribution to multicast users can be contrary to the benefit. Meanwhile, core users can negatively forward video for the BS due to their selfish behaviors. Therefore, a BS pricing method is employed as an incentive mechanism to facilitate the active video distribution by core users. To act in the benefits of core users, the video prices for core users vary and are lower than the prices for other users. In addition, it is assumed that each core user also wants to maximize its own benefits. Therefore, for each video content a x , designing an appropriate user incentive mechanism to provide the maximized benefits of the BS and core users and facilitate the video distribution by core users is a key problem to be solved in this paper.
To address the problems, the Stackelberg game-based pricing mechanism is proposed in this paper. The Stackelberg game consists of two game sides, namely the leader and the follower. The leader firstly provides a strategy in the game process, and then the follower gives its optimal strategy. Secondly, the leader observes the optimal strategy given by the follower and constantly adjusts its optimal strategy to achieve the balance. In the considered network scenario, the BS serves as the provider of video, namely the leader in the game model and the core users serve as the distributors for videos, namely the follower in the game model. The BS firstly determines the initial price and sends it to the core users, and then the core users give their strategies to the BS. Through negotiations and adjustments, the balance of the maximum benefits between the BS and the core users can be finally achieved. Besides, the benefits of the core users are directly proportional to the number of forwarded videos, which further encourages the active video distribution by the core users for the BS.
A. Benefits Model
By analyzing the benefits relationship between a core user and the BS, the benefits relationship in cluster c αβ can be constructed as shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 . Targeting at video a x in cluster c αβ , the benefits of the core user can be impacted due to the video distribution for the BS to multicast requesting users, therefore the core user can obtain rewards when distributing videos for the BS. To clearly describe this process, the related definition are given below.
Definition 1 (Uniform price P c a x ): P c a x denotes the price that requesting users without cooperating with the BS to distribute the videos should pay for video a x , Multicast users and other users should pay this price. to maximize the benefits of both sides. In order to maximize the benefits of both sides and set the optimal uniform price and preferential price for video a x in next time slot, we estimate the number of users in that time slot and then set up the relationship between the price and benefits.
In reality, the popularity of videos and the setting of uniform price P c a x and preferential price pc c α β a x for video a x can affect the number of users and the benefits of the core user and the BS. Obviously, given the certain preferential price pc c α β a x for video a x , lower uniform price P c a x brings a larger number of users and a lower benefit of the BS and the core user, and vice versa. In addition, the Click-Through Rate (CTR) and popularity of a given video are closely correlated and follow the Zipf distribution as described in Section I. Therefore, according to the basic principles of microeconomics [41] , the users for video a x in next time slot can be estimated by ψ =1 Υ D ψ < 0, which indicates that the benefits loss of the core user caused by the video distribution assistance is higher than the benefits gained from the BS, the core user cannot guarantee the video distribution to all multicast requesting users. The other is that the direct video transmitting to some multicast users by BS can achieve higher benefits than the assisted transmission by the core users. Specifically, let Υ 
When the encouragement price provided by the BS satisfies the constraints shown in (11.a), the core user can guarantee the video distribution to all multicast users, namely l 
Therefore, the benefit functions of the core users and the BS in cluster c αβ under various situations can be estimated. The proposed solution is to achieve the maximized benefits of both sides in each cluster and find the optimal uniform price and preferential price, which is expressed as
B. Pricing Mechanism
To reduce its load and enhance the video distribution efficiency, the BS promotes collaboration with the core users to optimize its benefits. Besides, the benefits functions of the core users and the BS in cluster c αβ are (12) and (13), and are related to factors such as the uniform price, preferential price and the number of requesting users. For the video a x in cluster c αβ , the optimal P c * a x and pc c α β * a x for video a x should be adjusted through the negotiation between the core users and the BS to achieve the maximized benefits of both sides. Targeting at this problem, a stackleberg game-based pricing mechanism is proposed to obtain the equilibrium solution of P c a x and pc c α β a x . In the proposed pricing mechanism, the BS, as the leader, firstly determines the pricing strategy. The benefits and traffic load of the BS should be both considered for the uniform price P c at the beginning, which determines the constraints interval between the (11.a) and (11.b) . When the BS load is relatively low, the quality of videos distributed by the core users is worse than the quality of videos distributed by the BS. Therefore, one part of the video of multicast users can be distributed by core user and the other part of the videos of multicast users can be distributed by the BS such as (11.b) and viceversa. Upon receiving the uniform price P c 
According to the above methods, upon receiving the optimal preferential price pc 
can be calculated by
Therefore, the optimal preferential price pc total can be obtained in cluster c αβ . The pseudo code of algorithm 1, namely the stackelberg-game based pricing mechanism in cluster c αβ is shown as Algorithm 1.
Through the above process, the benefits in each clusters of core users and the BS Π , based on the BS load and self-benefits; 2: Repeat;
The core user chooses the optimal preferential price pc
, as in (15), based on the uniform price P c
The BS chooses the optimal uniform price P c * a x (G), as in (17), according to the optimal preferential price pc c α β * ( G ) a x ; 6: else
7:
if P c
, as in (16), based on the uniform price P c
The BS chooses the optimal uniform price
, as in (18), according to the optimal preferential price pc
10: end if 11:
P c
total , given the total iteration times τ 14: end if 15: END (14), the above process will be repeated in an iterative manner. If the benefits of core users and the BS in iterations q and q , namely Π (q )
total , given the total iteration times τ , the preferential price pc * (q )
in each clusters and the optimal uniform price P c * (q )
are finally determined. To sum up, by the proposed mechanisms, the BS can determine the initial uniform price and preferential price at the beginning according to its benefits and load status in the proposed incentive mechanisms. Besides, the core users can get lager benefits from the BS by distributing more video to multicast users. As can be seen from the (15) and (16), the more videos core users distribute to multicast users, the higher encouragement price the core users can get from the BS. Hence, the incentive mechanisms effectively encourage video distribution by the core users.
C. Characteristics of the Proposed Mechanism
The characteristics of the proposed mechanism is studied in this section. According to Section V-B, the stackelberg game is the key to optimize the benefits of both sides, therefore the following lemmas can be derived. Lemma 1: The proposed mechanism is truthful. Proof: The stackelberg game employed to determine the optimal pricing strategy requires both sides to constantly negotiate to guarantee the optimal benefits. The truthfulness of the proposed mechanisms can be proved by the existence of the game equilibrium point. The research works in [42] [43] [44] proved the existence of the equilibrium point in stackelberg game, and the detailed proof procedure is shown in appendix.
Lemma 2: The proposed mechanism is computationally efficient.
Proof: Lemma 1 already proved the existence of the equilibrium point in stackelberg game. According to algorithm 1, the computational complexity of each iteration is O(C). Therefore, the overall computational complexity of the algorithm can be denoted by O(
Obviously, the proposed mechanisms is computationally efficient.
Lemma 3: The optimal retail price and distributor price are reasonably determined by the proposed mechanism Proof: The BS and core users in this paper form the repeated game and each game is called "stage game". The game strategies of the BS and core users in each stage game depend on their history behavior. Lemma 1 proved the existence of the equilibrium point in stackelberg game. According to the definitions of the repeated game, if the game strategies of all sides in the dynamical game and all subgames have the equilibrium point, the strategy combination is perfection of subgames. Therefore, the optimal uniform price and preferential price are reasonably determined by the proposed mechanism.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism through simulation by using MATLAB. The D2D video distribution scenario is established by the grid-based clustering method in Section III, and the side length of each cluster is is the distance from the BS to the core user. Other simulation parameters are set in accordance with the work [45] , as shown in Table I . Without loss of generality, multicast video transmission is based on H.264 video streaming in this paper, such as Foreman, 2 where the resolution of the Foreman is 352 × 288, the average bit rate S of the Foreman coding is 450 Kbps, and the average quality peak signal-to-noise ratio (PSNR) of the video is 43.32 dB. The video sequence is composed of many Groups of Picture (GOP), and each GOP has a different structure. Each GOP contains three image types, namely I frame, P frame and B frame [49] . In order to simulate the real mobility and encounter of users, we exploit the characteristics of human mobility trace datasets Infocom06 which records real users mobility trace. This trace is collected by the Cambridge Haggle projects [50] . In addition, to measure the quality of received video, the following three metrics are employed:
PSNR: PSNR is an objective evaluation of image quality. It is a function related to the mean square error between the original image and the processed image, which can be obtained as
where MSE is the mean square error between the original image and the processed image, and MAX I represents the maximum value of pixel color. Video delivery rate: The video delivery rate is defined as the ratio between the number of delivered videos to that of total videos.
Available video frame rate: The available video frame rate is the ratio between the number of received video frames by a user and the total number of video frames before playing the video.
A. Video Performance Analysis
To evaluate the performance of the proposed mechanism, three distribution mechanisms without considerations of social attribute proposed in [51] and incentive method proposed in [45] are compared as baseline mechanisms, namely no social attribute with D2D, no incentive mechanism with WiFi and D2D and no incentive mechanism with D2D. Fig. 5 reflects the relationship between the video quality and the average bit rate. Obviously, the growing bit rate from 0.6S to 2S signifies more rapid video compression and decoding rate as well as higher quality video transmitted to the users. When the bit rate reaches 2S, the video quality in terms of PSNR becomes stable. However, the overall video quality of the proposed mechanism is 11.5% and 25.2% higher than those of the video distribution mechanism without using an incentive method. This is because that with the increase of average bit rate S, the requirements for channel quality are also increasing. Such two video distribution mechanisms without using an incentive method choose the core users based on the channel quality which is better for PSNR. Nevertheless, the non-collaborative video forwarding due to selfish behaviors and the interrupted video transmission due to the social attribute of users still impact the performance of network. In particular, the non-collaborative video forwarding severely wastes the network resource, increases delay and degrades the user's QoS, therefore the video quality of the proposed mechanism is better than the scheme of no social attribute with D2D and two other solutions.
The video delivery rate under various average bit rates is shown in Fig. 6 . Obviously, the video delivery rate of video packets increases along with the growing bit rate, because the growing bit rate signifies the short time of transmitting a video packet. When the bit rate reaches 2S, the video delivery rate becomes smooth. The video delivery rate of the proposed mechanism is 18.3%, 19.4% and 47% higher than those of the video distribution mechanism without using social attribute and incentive method respectively. In addition, without taking into account the social attributes, the delivery rate of second mechanism is lower than the other two mechanisms without an incentive method at the beginning.
The available video frame rate under various average bit rates is shown in Fig. 7 . As can be seen, the available video frame rate of the proposed mechanism is 12.35%, 18.75% and 31.23% higher than those of the video distribution mechanism without using social attribute and incentive method respectively. This is because the user mobility is sufficiently considered to determine stably connected area of users. Besides, user familiarity is employed to select core users responsible for the video multicast distribution. Therefore, the video transmission stability and reliability can be effectively guaranteed. The performance of available video frame rate can also be improved by employing WiFi assistance, because the benefit loss of WiFi users is relatively small.
The available video frame rate under various distances from the BS to the core user is shown in Fig. 8 . The decrease of the available video frame rate along with the growing distance from the BS to the core user is slower than those of the video distribution mechanism without incentive method. This is because the proposed mechanism selects core users according to the encounter probability between users and the user familiarity. The proposed mechanism can effectively enhance the collaboration willingness of core users, reduce the video forwarding delay, improve the transmission efficiency, and avoid the packet loss during the video distribution. What's more, the other two mechanisms without using an incentive method choose the core users based on the channel quality. So with the increase of distances from the BS to the core user, their video quality is lower than others. The video recovery performance of the three mechanisms with Foreman and Bridge Far video sequences is shown in Fig. 9 . As can be seen, the quality of the video frames of the proposed mechanism is better than those of the video distribution mechanism without using an incentive method. According to Fig. 5 , the average PSNR of the proposed mechanism is higher than 35 dB and the distortion of the video frames is light. However, the average PSNR of the baseline mechanism without WIFI assistance and incentive mechanism is higher than 25 dB, given the fact that the video frames with PSNR under 20 are unacceptable.
B. Mechanisms Performance Analysis
The feasibility of the proposed algorithm is validated in this section. The detailed procedure of the stackelberg game based user incentive mechanism was introduced in Section IV-B. The BS initiates the game and determines both the uniform price and the preferential price. Here we set the uniform price as the same as the preferential price, and the benefits of the BS can be maximized in this situation. As shown in Fig. 10 , the Encouragement Price for core users start from 0. After the constant negotiation and iterative adjustments, the optimal preferential price can be determined and the benefits of both sides can be balanced.
Besides, to validate the efficiency of the proposed mechanism, the video offload rates under various user types are simulated. As shown in Fig. 11 , the growing number of users indicates the increased proportion of D2D assisted video offload. Especially, the video offload rate of the proposed mechanisms is 9.6% higher than that of the mechanism with the random core user and multicast user selection strategies. It can be explained that the randomly selected core user and multicast user may cause unstable or interrupted connections and possible retransmission.
VII. CONCLUSION
A social attribute aware incentive mechanism for D2D video distribution in cellular networks is proposed in this paper. With the mechanism, core users are motivated to perform video distribution and furhter reduce the transmission load of the BS. Besides, the user mobility and social relationship among users are carefully considered to choose multicast users and core users. Finally, a stackelberg game based user pricing mechanism is proposed to achieve the optimal benefit balance between core users and the BS through a negotiation. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed mechanism can achieve better performance for both video distribution and load balance. In our future work, the energy consumption of D2D users would be considered for D2D video distribution.
APPENDIX PROOF OF THE OPTIMAL EQUILIBRIUM POINT

A. Stackelberg Equilibrium
In our paper, BS is considered as the leader, where its strategy set is the uniform price P c a x and the cost function is shown in (12) . Core user is considered as the follower, where its strategy set is the preferential price pc c α β a x and the cost function is shown in (13) . At first, BS, the leader, will give the initial strategy P c ) is the equilibrium point of the stackelberg game.
B. Existence and Uniqueness of the Stackelberg Equilibrium
Theorem 1: For the proposed BS-leader, Core usersfollowers Stackelberg game, a unique stackelberg game exists between the BS and Core users if the following conditions are satisfied.
1) The strategy set of each player is nonempty, convex, and compact. 2) Each core user has a unique optimal best-response strategy once informed of the BS's strategy.
3) The BS admits a unique optimal strategy given the identified best strategies of all core users. Proof. 1): Because the strategy sets defined in Definition 1 and Definition 2 are sets of linear [i.e., constraint (11) ], these sets are readily defined as nonempty, convex, and compact [52] .
Proof. 2): It is obvious that (12.a) is the linear functions for preferential price pc c α β a x . Moreover, the strategy sets of core users are also linear, and then there exists the unique optimal best-response strategy for preferential price pc c α β a x . However, to find the unique optimal best-response strategy of (12.b) for a given initial strategy, we should prove that the benefits functions of core user for pc 
By taking (21) to be zero, we obtain the best-response function of core user as shown in (16) . In addition, the second-order derivative of Π 
Clearly, the value of (22) is always positive. Meanwhile, as its strategy set given in constraint (11) has already been proved to be a convex, the best-response strategy in terms of (16) is guaranteed to be optimal and unique, so condition 2) is proved.
